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THE AMERICAN HAGUE TRIBUNAL
The statement that, as a matter of last resort, we are governed
b%, courts rather than by our legislatures, and that the Supreme
Court of the United States is the most powerful tribunal in the
world, has so often been made as to be a truism. And yet,
perhaps few of us have taken time, amidst the rush of business
and in our persual of the thousands of cases which are yearly
decided by the courts, to take an account of the march of events,
and to realize not merely the extent of this judicial power but its
yearly extension and advancement.
It has only been recently, indeed, that the problems of govern-
ment have really weighed upon us and that our attention has been
seriously called to them. We have in a large measure been a
frontier and a pioneer people. We have had a continent to
develop and to exploit. There has been room for all, and the
doctrine that one must so use his own as not to injure that of
another has had in it but little personal meaning or significance.
Our political and legal problems indeed have been theoretical
and general rather than personal and practical. In the future,
however, the province of government will be tested to its limits.
It is coming to be so tested even to-day. Not merely has the
public domain, which in the past has been our great social outlet
and safety valve become nearly exhausted; not merely is the
struggle for existence becoming keener and keener; not merely
is the law being called upon more and more to determine the
rights of individuals, within the respective states and to determine
how far the private individual may or may not go, in the exercise
and enjoynient of the liberty and rights of property on which the
Anglo-Saxon lays so much stress, but our problems are becom-
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ing interstate, and almost international in their aspect and in their
scope.
In the solution of these interstate questions and in the laying
down of the rules of interstate conduct which shall govern and
control and form the interstate common law of the future, Con-
gress so far has taken and perhaps can take but little part. The
duty has fallen upon, perhaps has been assumed by, the Supreme
Court of the Nation. Its assumption has been justified not under
any specific grant of power contained in the Constitution. but
under the clause and under the clause alone which gives to the
Supreme Court of the Nation original jurisdiction in "contro-
versies between two or more states."
The Supreme Court of the Nation indeed, in so far as the
several states of the Union are concerned, is coming to be a
sort of Hague Tribunal, but a Hague Tribunal which has the
power of compelling a submission to its jurisdiction and of en-
forcing its mandates and decrees. As such a tribunal, it is
evolving and developing an interstate international raw of its
own, whose foundation principle is equality of rights,' and whose
method of pleading and procedure is divorced from the techni-
calities of the past and allows the fullest latitude of investigation
and research. "Sitting as it were, as an international as well as
a domestic tribunal," says Chief Justice Fuller in the case of
Kansas v. Colorado,2 "we apply Federal Law, State Law and
International Law, as the exigencies of the particular case may
demand; and we are unwilling in this case to proceed on the
mere technical admissions made by the demurrer. Nor do we
regard it as necessary, whatever imperfections a close analysis
1 "One cardinal rule underlying all the relations of the states to each
other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on the same level
with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of the
others, and is bound to yield its own views to none. Yet, whenever, as in
the case of Missouri v. Illinois, i8o U. S. 208, the action of one state
reaches, through the agency of natural laws. into the territory of another
state, the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the
two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this
court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between
them. In other words, through these successive disputes and decisions
this court is practically building up what may not improperly be called
interstate common law." Mr. Justice Brewer in Kansas v. Colorado,
27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655, 667.
2 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522, 56o.
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of the pending bill may disclose, to compel its amendment at this
stage of the litigation. We think proof should be made as to
whether Colorado is herself actually threatening to exhaust the
flow of the Arkansas river in Kansas; whether what is described
in the bill as the underflow is the subterranean stream flowing
in a known and defined channel, and not merely percolating
through the stata below; whether certain persons, firms and cor-
porations in Colorado must be made parties thereto; what lands
in Kansas are actually situated on the banks of the river, and
what, either in Colorado or Kansas, are absolutely dependent on
water therefrom; the extent of the water-shed or the drainage
area of the Arkansas river; the possibilities of the maintenance
of a sustained flow through the control of flood waters; in short,
the circumstances, a variation in which might induce the court
to either grant, modify or deny the relief sought, or any part
thereof. The result is that in view of the intricate questions
arising on the record, we are constrained to forbear proceeding
until all the facts are before us on the evidence."
The exercise of this jurisdiction has as yet mainly been in-
voked in the cases where the citizens of one state, in the dis-
position of their sewage, have polluted running streams to the
detriment of the citizens of the states through which they after-
wards flow, 3 or have diverted and exhausted these streams for
irrigation or mining purposes, so as to deprive other states of
their just share of the waters thereof,4 or have so conducted
their manufacturing and mechanical operations as to befoul the
natural atmosphere and to injure the natural resources and vege-
tation of adjoining states. A broad groundwork on which to
build all extended jurisdiction has, however, been laid. In the
cases decided, the Supreme Court of the United States has
assumed jurisdiction as a matter of necessity. Its jurisdiction.
paternalistic though it may seem, is justified by an assumption
of a state sovereignity rather than by a negation of it and has
been made necessary by the recognition of that sovereignty in the
3 Misso1ri V. Illinois, ISo U. S. 208, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 331; S. C. 200
U. S. 496, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268.
4 Kansas v. Colorado, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; S. C. 27 Sup Ct. Rep. 655.
5 Georgia sr. Teninesssee Copper Co., 2o6 J. S. 230; 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 68.
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law of the past.0  Under the old law, 'it is true. that the lower
riparian owner or the owner of the vegetation injured by the
nuisance, had a measure of redress, but the redress could, without
the consent of the state, only be against the particular individuals
offending and could only be asserted in the local courts of the
state or the federal courts in the districts in which the male-
factors resided, and in such cases was determined by the local
law and the local custom. Even the jurisdiction of the local
courts was restricted and their mandates and decrees confined
to persons and objects within, their borders. So too, even in
matters affecting the public health or the protection of its natural
resources, the state as a whole was powerless, and the public
interests, on whose immediate protection the whole future of
communities or of the state itself might depend, were dependent
upon the willingness of some individual property owner to under-
take the burdens and expenses of a vexatious law suit. Such a
","The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two
private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied
upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are
wanting here. The state owns very little of the territory alleged to be
affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at
least, is small. This is a suit by a state for an injury to it in its capacity
of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state has an interest independent
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped
of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might
have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with it remains
the final power. The alleged damage to the state as a private owner is
merely a make weight and we may lay on one side the dispute as to
whether the destruction of forests has led to the gullying of its roads.
The caution with which demands of this sort on the part of a state for
relief from injuries analogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon
in Missouri V. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268. But it is
plain that some such demands must be recognized if the grounds alleged
are proved. When the states by their union made the forcible abatement
of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to
submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility
of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining
quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this
court. Some peculiarities necessarily mark a suit of this kind. If the
state has a case at all it is somewhat more certainly entitled to specific
relief than a private party might be. It is not lightly to be required to give
up quasi-sovereign rights for pay." Mr. Justice Holmes in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 61g.
7 Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black 485, 67 U. S. 311.
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system for determining controversies of the magnitude of those
under consideration, could never have proved satisfactory and as
the country develops and the states become empires in population
and in power, can never be relied upon to maintain harmony
among and to make and preserve a united nation of the people
and the states represented in the vast American commonwealth.
Nor could Congress itself well act in such matters. Not merely
would every attempt on its part give rise to political combination
and sectional log-rolling, to the combining of section against
section and locality against locality, so that state and personal
rights would be dependent upon political strength and the ability
to combine, but there seems to be no warrant in the Constitution
itself for any such assumption of power. The polluting of the
air and the befouling of streams can for instance hardly be said
to be interferences with interstate commerce. On the other hand,
the grant to the Federal Supreme Court of jurisdiction over
controversies between two or more states, would seem to have
anticipated controversies of this very nature. And that there
is need of some tribunal to settle such controversies there can
be little doubt-a tribunal of the nature of the Hague Tribunal,
but with the power of enforcement which that tribunal (Toes not
possess.
The interstate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court indeed, is
based on the right and the necessity of adjudicating on matters
which are interstate and almost international in their nature, and
is in no sense justified on the theory that the laws or even the
Constitution of the United States are involved. It has in fact, as
we have before said, been exercised in cases where Congress per-
haps could not have legislated at all, that is to say in cases in
which no power of legislation has either directly or inferentially
been delegated to that body. It arises out of the inherent necessity
of the case and the otherwise inadequacy of the national system of
jurisprudence.
"The state of Colorado," says Chief Justice Fuller in his
opinion in the case of Kansas v. Colorado,8 "contends, that as a
sovereign and independent state, she is justified if her geog-
raphical situation and material welfare demand it in her judg-
ment, in consuming for beneficial purposes all the waters within
her boundaries; and that as the sources of the Arkansas river
are in Colorado, she may absolutely and wholly deprive Kansas
&22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
and her citizens of any use of or share in the waters of that
river. She says that she occupies towards the state of Kansas
the same position that foreign states occupy towards each other,
although she admits that the Constitution does not contemplate
that contoversies between members of the United States may be
settled by reprisal or force of arms, and that to secure the orderly
adjustment of such differences power was lodged in this court
to hear and determine them. The rule of decision, however, it is
contended, is the rule which controls foreign and independent
states in their relations to each other, that by the law of nations
the primary and absolute right of a state is self-preservation; that
the improvement of her revenues, arts, agriculture, and com-
merce are incontrovertible rights of sovereignty; that she has
dominion over-all things within her territory, including all bodies
of water, standing or running within her boundary lines; that
the moral obligations of a state to observe the demands of comity
cannot be made the subject of controversy between states; and
that only those controversies are justiciable in this court which,
prior to the Union, would have been just cause for reprisal by
the complaining state; and that, according to international law,
reprisal can only be made when a positive wrong has been in-
flicted or rights stricti juris withheld. But when one of our states
complains of the infliction of such wrong or the deprivation of
such rights by another state, how shall the existence of cause of
complaint be ascertained, and be accommodated if well-founded?
The states of the Union cannot make war upon each other. They
cannot "grant letters of marque and reprisal." They cannot make
reprisal on each other by embargo. They cannot enter upon
diplomatic relations and make treaties. As Mr. Justice Baldwin
remarked in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts: "Bound hand and
foot by the prohibitions of the Constitution, a complaining state
can neither treat, agree, nor fight with its adversaries without the
consent of Congress. A resort to the judicial power is the only
means for legally adjusting or persuading a state which has pos-
session of disputed territory to enter into an agreement or com-
pact relating to a controverted boundary. Few, if any, will be
made if it is left to the pleasure of the state in possession; but
when it is known that some tribunal can decide on the right, it is
most probable that most controversies will be settled by compact."
12 Pet. 7269, L. Ed. 1261. "War," said Mr. Justice Johnson, "is
a suit prosecuted by the sword; and where the question to be
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decided is one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made
flagrantc bcllo by the party that fails can only derive validity
from treaty stipulations." 12 Wheat. 528, 6 L. Ed. 717. "The
publicists suggest as just causes of war, defense, recovery of
one's own, and punishment of an enemy. But as between states
of this Union, who can determine what would be a just cause of
war? Comity demanded that navigable rivers should be free,
and therefore the freedom of the Mississippi, the Rhine, the
Scheldt, the Danube, the St. Lawrence, the Amazon, and other
rivers has been at different times been secured by treaty; but if a
state of this Union deprives another state of its rights in a
navigable stream, and Congress has not regulated the subject, as
no treaty can be made between them, how is the matter to be
adjusted?"
The conclusions arrived at, it will be seen, involve both an asser-
tion of state sovereignty, and a negation of that sovereignty.
They apply the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
to states as well as to individuals. They seem to confer property
as well as political rights upon a citizen of the United States.
They apply in a large sense the principle that the welfare of the
Nation as a whole, is the highest law, and that the individual
unit must be protected in order that the whole may grow in
strength. They apply a republican doctrine of equality among
the states as well as among the people who are residents therein,
and above all, they recognize a paternalistic interest on the part
of the states in the welfare of their inhabitants which will justify
a suit in the name of the state for their protection. "In deciding
this case on demurrer we said, referring to the opinion in
Missouri v. Illinois," said the Supreme Court of the United States
in Kansas v. Colorado,9 "the court there ruled that the mere fact
that a state had no pecuniary interest in the controversarv would
not defeat the original jurisdiction of this court, which might be
invoked by the state as parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or repre-
sentative of all or a considerable portion of its citizens; and that
the threatened pollution of the waters of a river flowing between
states, under the authority of one of them, thereby putting the
health and comfort of the citizens of the other in jeopardy, pre-
sented a cause of action justiciable under the Constitution. In
the case before us, the state of Kansas files her bill as representing
and on behalf of her citizens, as well as in vindication of her
9 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655, 668.
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alleged rights as an individual owner, and seeks relief in respect
of being deprived of the waters of the river accustomed to flow
through and across the state, and the consequent destruction of
the property of herself and of her 'citizens and injury to their
health and comfort. The action complained of is state action, and
not the action of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers.
It is the state of Kansas which invokes the action of this court,
charging that through the action of Colorado, a large portion
of its territory is threatened with disaster. In this respect it is
in no manner evading the provisions of the iith Amendment to
the Federal Constitution. It is not acting directly and solely for
the benefit of any individual citizen to protect his riparian rights.
Beyond its property rights it has an interest as a state in this.
large tract of land bordering on the Arkansas river. Its pros-
perity affects the general welfare of the state. The controversy
rises, therefore, above a mere question of local private right and
involves a matter of state interest, and must be considered from
that standpoint."
The real difficulty in the way of the jurisdiction is to be found
in the matter of its enforcement. It is of course assumed, that
if the mandates of the court are disobeyed, obedience can be
enforced in the last extremity by the army and the naval forces
of the nation. But both the President of the United States as
commander-in-chief of the army, and the National Congress
itself, might refuse to obey such a mandate and in such an event
they could hardly be compelled to act. "Very different is the
duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed," says Chief Justice Chase, in his
famous opinion in Mississippi v. Johnson. 0 "By the first of these
acts he is obliged to assign generals to command in the several
military districts, and-to detail sufficient military force to enable
such officers to discharge their duties under the law. By the sup-
plementary act, other duties are imposed on the several com-
manding generals, and these duties must necessarily be performed
under the supervision of the President, as commander-in-chief.
The duty thus imposed upon the President is in no just sense
ministerial. It is purely executive and political. An attempt on
the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce
the performance of such duties by the President might be justly
characterized in the language of Chief Justice Marshal, as "an
104 Wallace 475.
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absurd and excessive extravagance. The Congress is the legis-
lative department of the government; the President is the execu-
tive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the
judicial department; though the acts of both when performed are
in proper cases subject to its cognizance."
Whether as in the case of Chisholm v. Gcorgia, an affirma-
tive exercise of the powers referred to will lead to open defiance
and to the adoption of a constitutional amendment which will
take away the jurisdiction, is also yet to be seen. These questions
must be met as the occasion is presented. So far the Supreme
Court has granted no affirmative relief," and in each case has
decided adversely to the petitioners on the merits. The time must
come, however, when affirmative relief will be decreed, and the
power of the court and the willingness of the people to stand
behind its mandates will be put to the extreme test. One thing
is sure and that is, that as our country is settled, our interests
conflict, the struggle for existence grows keener and keener and
our states in population and in power become empires in them-
selves, either state lines must be swept away altogether, or some
sort of interstate Hague Tribunal maintained which shall be
enabled and empowered to settle those controversies which are
interstate and almost international in their nature, and which, if
arising between nations, could only be settled by treaty or negotia-
tion, and if these means failed, by the arbitrament of arms. This
is no doubt, a government by the judiciary carried to its extremest
limits, but it would seem to be the only method by which a nation
such as ours is destined to become can be held together. Mr.
Bryce, it is true, has stated that the state "is now merely a part of
the grander whole which seems to be slowly absorbing its func-
tions and stunting its growth as the great tree stunts the shrubs
over which its spreading boughs have begun to cast their shade,"
but local and communal interests are as strong as ever and are
not dependent upon state lines or state organizations. State lines
have usually been selected indeed, because they have been the
natural geographic boundaries, and the people in the districts
which they separate have often had local and divergent interests
to protect. The people south of the southern boundary line of
the state of Colorado would not be the less interested in the
waters of their rivers if the state boundary line were abolished.
"Except in suits to settle boundary disputes and for the collection
of state debts.
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Localities must exist under any political system and the state, in
most instances, can serve as a unit as well as any other division.
It is as we have said, noticeable that the American states have
largely been separated and differentiated on topographical lines.
Viriginia differs from West Virginia in its natural geography,
resources and accessibility, and Wisconsin from Illinois. State
boundaries have as a rule, been drawn along natural and not
along arbitrary lines. It is also true, as Mr. Bryce asserts, that
the state "does not interest its citizens as it once did," and that
"men do not now say, like Ames in 1782, that their state is their
country." It is true that the migratory habits of our people and
modern commercialism have separated us from our traditions,
and that the rocks and rills which are most loved, are often those
of the state or country of our boyhood's and not of our man-
hood's days. It is true that in wandering, as we do, from state
to state, we destroy much of our sentiment. But though com-
mercialism has destroyed these things, it has given a keener,
more selfish and therefore more aggressive interest in the natural
wealth and resources which are around us, even though they are
to be found in the state of our adoption and not the state of our
birth. There can be but little doubt, therefore, that the clashing
interests of the sections will in the future call more and more for
settlement and adjustment, and that the interstate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court will not only be constantly invoked but will, as
time goes on, become more and more necessary.
Andrew Alexander Bruce.
